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Abstract. The Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN) has gained popularity as a new technology
for e-Health, and is considered as one of the key research areas in computer science and
healthcare applications. WBAN collects patients’ data, monitors constantly their physiological
parameters, using small implantable or wearable sensors, and communicates these data using
wireless communication techniques in short range. WBAN is playing a huge role in improving
the quality of healthcare. Still, due to sensitive and concurrent nature of e-Heath systems, current
research has showed that designers must take into considerations the security and privacy
protection of the data collected by a WBAN to safeguard patients from different exploits or
malicious attacks, since e-Health technologies are increasingly connected to the Internet via
wireless communications. In this paper we outline the most important security requirements for
WBANs. Furthermore, we discuss key security threats to avoid. Finally, we conclude with a
summary of security mechanisms to follow that address security and privacy concerns of
WBANs, and need to be explored in an increasingly connected healthcare world.
Keywords: WBAN, e-Health, information security, wireless.

1. Introduction
In a digital society, electronic healthcare is one of the services that will contribute in improving
the life quality of citizens. Recently, the fast development of wireless communication and
intelligent medical sensors, which can be implanted or worn on human body, has made the
wireless body area networks (WBANs) a promising method that will revolutionize practices of
healthcare [1–3]. The term of WBAN was first created by Van Dam et al. [4] and received the
attention of numerous researchers from different fields [5-6]. WBANs simplify and accelerate
processes of healthcare, such as emergency medical responses and clinical diagnosis, increasing
significantly healthcare efficiency.
WBAN is a communication network between human and computers through wearable devices
[7]. On the whole, we can distinguish two types of devices: sensors and actuators. The sensors
measure externally or internally parameters of the human body, for example measuring the body
temperature, the beat of the heart or recording a continued electrocardiogram (ECG). From the
other side the actuators (or actors) perform some actions related to the data that sensors send to
them or through communication with the user. A personal device, like a smartphone or a PDA,
which serves as a data sink for the wireless device, generally conducts interactions with the
patient or other users. Next, we present the architecture of a WBAN in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1: WBAN Architecture.
The WBAN mostly contains small wireless sensor nodes that are positioned around, in or on a
patient’s body. These sensors constantly monitor vital signs of patients, like pulse,
electrocardiogram (ECG), and blood pressure; or significant environmental parameters like
humidity and temperature. Patient related data that are collected by sensors are transmitted to one
or more servers or gateways, which can further perform data processing and distributed storage.
The patient’s data collected from all WBANs can be eventually sent to a centralized database for
permanent healthcare records. Therefore, the authorized users of patient’s data can access the
data from the database remotely, or create a query to take information locally from the WBAN,
depending on the application scenario.
We face a lot of new challenges when trying to develop a WBAN healthcare application, such as
transmission of reliable data, appropriate distribution of data in the right time, power
management, node computation and mobility support, middleware and fast detection of events
[8-10]. Furthermore, the privacy of patient is vulnerable if security is not considered when
implementing new technologies in healthcare applications [11,12]. Particularly must be
guaranteed that patient related data are accessed only by authorized users; else, the patients’
privacy could be compromised. However, since private data are stored in distributive manner in
WBANs, they may be easily disclosed because of a physical compromise of a node.
Consequently, to ensure patients’ privacy, it is needed cryptographically enforced access and data
encryption.
This paper gives contributions in presenting some security and privacy requirements in WBANs.
We also discuss some WBANs security threats and initiate discussions on security mechanisms
of WBANs to solve all the drawbacks and concerns regarding security and privacy. Next, in this
paper is emphasized the need for the design of cryptographic methods that are reasonably
resource optimal, low transmission overhead and storage, suggesting potential future directions
for WBANs security. Finally, it concludes with some security mechanisms to follow that address
WBANs security and privacy concerns, and need to be explored in an increasingly connected
healthcare world.

2. WBAN Security and Privacy Requirements
It is essential to understand the security and privacy issues in WBANs, since they are two
essential components for the system security of WBAN healthcare monitoring applications. In
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this section we will discuss: (1) which would be the security requirements in WBAN before
implementing suitable security mechanisms; and (2) e-health data privacy requirements.
Data confidentiality requirement is to protect the disclosure of e-health data. Sensor nodes, which
send sensitive data in WBANs, can be compromised because of their not tampered proof nature.
The compromise can lead to the disclosure of data if the whole data is encrypted and saved in
one node both with its encryption key. The eavesdropping of communication can seriously harm
patients because the attacker can use their data for criminal purposes. Encrypting the patient
related data with a secret key attains data confidentiality, and this key must be shared on a secure
communication channel between the sensor nodes and local servers.
Data Integrity requirement is to protect the modification of patient related data when
communicated over a vulnerable WBAN. In WBANs altered data could lead to dangerous
consequences, especially life-critical events. Appropriate data integrity mechanisms at the node
and the local server certify that an attacker does not modify the received data. This can be attained
by using data authentication protocols.
Data availability requirement guarantees that physicians could always obtain patient related data
at the time when they require. The availability of a WBAN can be a target for an attacker. The
attacker can capture or disable a sensor node, by resulting in loss of data availability.
Consequently, it is necessary to maintain the operation of the sensor nodes in healthcare
applications always on and shift the operation to another node in case of data availability loss.
It is not enough to guarantee data integrity and confidentiality, without considering also data
freshness requirement. An attacker can get data in a transit and replay them later to fool the local
server. Data freshness guarantees that patient data is fresh or contemporary, and the attacker has
not replayed the old messages.
Data authentication is another WBAN security requirement for healthcare applications. It is
essential for each sensor node and local server to prove that the data was sent by a trusted node,
and not by an attacker that cheated the node or the local server to accept fake data. The sender of
the e-health data must be authenticated and injection of data from outside the WBAN should not
be allowed. Using symmetric techniques can attain data authentication in a WBAN.
Secure management requirement is required at the local server since it provides key distribution
schemes to the sensor nodes in order to consent encryption and decryption operations.
Many users in a WBAN healthcare application such as physicians, nurses, doctors, insurance
companies, pharmacists, social workers access patient’s data. So, it is highly recommended to
implement an access control mechanism based on roles in real time healthcare applications that
can control the access of the patient’s physiological data, and guarantee its privacy.
Patient permission requirement is necessary when a healthcare provider is distributing his/her
health records to another healthcare authority, such as medical researcher, insurance company,
and etc.

3. WBAN Security Threats
WBANs certainly improve the quality of care for patients, but the medical sensor devices sense
the sensitive patient’s data and uses wireless communication to transmit it. Therefore, it must be
guaranteed the security and privacy for patient’s physiological parameters from any security
threats. Based on the security requirements, in the following we examine security threats that
would be harmful for the WBAN healthcare applications.
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Secrecy and Authentication Attacks: In this category are included threats such as
eavesdropping and monitoring on patient vital parameters, spoofing of packets, or masquerade
and packet replay attacks. Eavesdropping is the most common threat to e-Health systems. By
snooping to patient’s sensitive data, an attacker can easily track the activity of users from
communication channel. Based on the patient related data he/she can analyze patients’ activities.
One case of authentication attacks in WBANs is faking of alarms on patient related data [30]. In
a WBAN healthcare application an adversary can easily cheat a sensor node while patient related
data is transmitted to the local server. In this attack, an illegal sensor node acts as a real one to
the network. This can lead to false system alarms, for instance an emergency team can start an
unnecessary rescue operation. A masquerade node can also create denial of service attacks, by
interrupting the application functionality. Furthermore, if a masquerade sensor node gets the
physiological parameters of a patient, this can pose a replay threat to a WBAN e-health
application. Thus, attacks on secrecy and authentication endanger WBANs healthcare
applications. Standard cryptographic techniques and Message Authentication Code (MAC) can
safeguard the authenticity and secrecy of communication channels.
Service Integrity Attacks: In this type of attacks is included threat to information when in
transit. In WBAN healthcare applications, sensor devices capture patient related data and send it
to the local server or the hospital server. While the data is in transit, it may be attacked. This can
trigger a false alarm or can hide the true state of a patient, leading to a disaster event. Message
alteration threatens the integrity of WBAN sensor nodes. Service integrity attacks don’t occur
only during transmission times, but also during storing times. WBANs can be protected from
these attacks if implemented Message Authentication Code techniques.
Network Availability Attacks: Network availability attacks are referred also as Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks. DoS attacks try to make unavailable to its users the network resource and
affect network’s capacity and performance. DoS threat can be even more disrupting in WBAN
healthcare applications since it is necessary for the network to be always on to monitor the patient
health. Since WBANs are a type of wireless sensor networks (WSN), most of their DOS attacks
are inherited from WSN, but, because of the unique features of WBAN, there exist certain
differences between DOS attacks that can happen in WBAN compared to WSN.

4. WBAN Security Mechanisms
There exist a lot of security mechanisms recommended for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN),
however few of them can be implemented in a WBAN that has low power computation. For
instance, the IEEE 802.15.4 is a standard designed for Wireless Personal Area Networks with
low data rate, so we can call it a low power standard. Control layers that IEEE 802.15.4 standard
specifies are media access and physical ones, and it focuses on low speed and cost pervasive
communication between devices. This is a very relevant standard for WBANs since it supports
applications with low data rate and cost power consumption. For this reason it is implemented
by many researchers and designers to develop security mechanisms and protocols for Wireless
Body Area Networks. The IEEE 802.15.4 security modes are classified into null, encryption only
(AES-CTR), authentication only (AES-CBC-MAC), and encryption and authentication (AESCCM).
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4.1. AES-CTR
Sensor nodes, to encrypt the data and to provide confidentiality protection, use the Counter (CTR)
mode (also known as Integer Counter Mode) by using Advance Encryption Standard (AES) block
cipher. In this mode the plaintext is broken into 16-byte blocks b1, b2, ..., bn, and the ciphertext is
computed in the sender side: ci=bi XOR Ek(xi), where ci is the ciphertext, bi is the data block, and
Ek(xi) is the encryption of the counter xi. Figure 2 shows the process of encryption and decryption
of CTR.

Fig. 2: CTR encryption and decryption process.

4.2. AES-CBC-MAC
A secure authentication and message integrity protection is required in a WBAN. A Cipher-Block
Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) mode indicates that an n-block message B
= b1, b2, ..., bn will be authenticated between two parties involved that share a secret key, K, for
the block cipher, E. The sensor nodes can compute a 32, 64, or 128 bit MAC. Only parties that
have symmetric key can compute the MAC.
In this mode, the plaintext is XORed with the previous encrypted text until the final MAC is
achieved. In this moment the ciphertext is generated by ci= Ek(bi XOR ci-1) and plaintext can be
generated by bi= Dk(ci) XOR ci-1. The sender pairs the plaintext with the calculated MAC. The
receiver located in Tier 2 authenticates the message by calculating its own MAC and compares
it with the received MAC of sensor nodes. The body sensor network coordinator (receiver)
accepts the packet if both MACs are similar. The block diagram of a CBC-MAC operation is
shown in Figure 3.

Fig. 3: CBC-MAC operation.
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4.3. AES-CCM
The Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) security mode is a combination of CTR and CBC modes
that addresses a high-level security, including both encryption and data integrity. The sensor
nodes first apply the integrity protection to the header and data payload of the MAC frames using
AES-CBC-MAC mode and then encodes the frames using AES-CTR mode. It can be used to
communicate sensitive information, for instance to update programs in implantable cardiac
defibrillators and pacemakers.

Conclusion
A Wireless Body Area Network is estimated to be a very valuable technology with potential to
provide a broad range of profits to patients, a continuously monitoring of health and give real
time feedback to the patient or medical personnel. Security is an essential feature for the
implementation of WBANs. The implementation of WBANs must fulfill the rigorous security
and privacy requirements. However, designing security practices results to be a complicated
process because of the limitations and features of WBAN’s environment. The common security
methodologies are not relevant for WBANs. An appropriate security mechanism in a WBAN
must be low cost and lightweight in the view of resource consumption. Furthermore, we must
not forget that, however, normally noise concerns are associated to quality of service, but they
can lead to serious consequences related to security threats in WBANs. Therefore, a proper
security mechanism for WBANs must take into considerations vulnerability of WBANs to the
noise and implement an efficient and powerful error recovery method to reduce/stop this weak
point.
WBAN is increasing fast but up to now there is no solid and unified security framework for these
types of networks. The research in data security and privacy of WBANs is still in its beginning
nowadays; more studies and researches are needed in this area.
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